bombing mission could undermine American hegemonic in? terests in the Gulf that are served by a continuation of the sanctions regime.
For seven years, the Bush/Thatcher-Clinton/Blair policy has been to continue the Gulf war through a sanctions regime with five components, three of them multilateral and two uni? lateral: a weapons embargo; a civilian trade embargo, modi? fied under the "oil for food" provisions; ongoing inspections, monitoring and surveillance of Iraqi military facilities by in? ternational civil servants; "no-fly zones" patrolled by US forces; and periodic punitive air strikes. This regime serves at least three major, long-standing US interests in the Gulf.
The success of the United Nations Special Commission on 160 (1994-95) 198(1990-95) While the accuracy of statistics demonstrating the impact of United Na? tions sanctions on Iraq cannot be fully determined, there is no question that their impact has been severe. Infant mortality has doubled from the presanctions era, with the Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO) reporting a fivefold increase in mortality among children under age five. While the latter figure may be overstated,6 the health and nutritional profile of young children remains very poor, with an estimated 30 percent of children suffering from chronic or acute malnutrition.7 Kwashiorkor and marasmus?symptoms of severe protein-deficiency and usually seen only in famines?are increas? ingly common. In explaining this situation, diverse sources point to a combi? nation of "poor nutrition and increased prevalence of disease?compounded by inadequate health services"8?this in a country where, prior to the Gulf War, more than 90 percent of the population had access to primary health care. Maternal mortality is also believed to have increased several times since 1991, although hard data are not available.9
Other statistics reflecting the impact of the sanctions include a two-thirds decrease in the number of calories per capita supplied by government food rations; a 12-fold increase in the incidence of typhoid; and a 90 percent drop in per capita income (GDP/capita). According to the World Health Organiza? tion (WHO), "The vast majority of the country's population has been on a semi-starvation diet for years."10
Prior to the imposition of sanctions, Iraq imported some 70 percent of its food. Under the sanctions regime, the government attempted to increase agricultural production, but productivity has been limited by the lack of in? puts (machinery, pesticides, water), as well as by increasing soil salinity. An FAO Mission to Iraq in the summer of 1997 found that 25 percent of young men and 16 percent of young women show signs of chronic energy defi? ciency, reflecting the reduced availability of food over the past seven years.11 This report also cited a number of nutrients missing from present-day diets in Iraq, vitamins A and C most notable among them. Before sanctions, 93 percent of urban and 70 percent of rural residents had access to potable water. Currently more than half of rural residents do not have access to clean water. Studies by UNICEF (1994) and WHO (1996) This spurious legalistic argument ran afoul of issues that had bedeviled the UNSCOM regime all along. First, although SC686, which brought a provisional end to the hostilities, does expressly reserve the authorization to use "all necessary means" to force compliance with subsequent resolutions, it also leaves judgment on these matters to the Security Coun? cil, not individual states. Second, although none of the four UN resolutions spells out the precise conditions that Iraq must meet before sanctions are lifted, the American assertion that punishment must continue as long as Saddam Hussein rules Iraq is legally untenable. Most experts agree that once in? spectors certify an end to Iraq's weapons of mass destruction program, sanctions end. Already in October 1997, Russia and France proposed easing the trade embargo in light of the sig? nificant reduction in Iraq's nuclear and missile arsenal uncTer UNSCOM supervision. The US and the UK resisted, insist?
ing that their inspectors could ferret out suspected secret chemical and biological laboratories. This touched on the UN's sensitivity about neutrality and the multi-nationality of UNSCOM inspections teams, which, while nominated by their governments, are supposed to be drawn from as many coun? tries and regions as possible, with particular care to avoid staffing with experts from"intelligence-providing states."These issues made it possible for the Iraqi dictator to complain that through their domination of the UNSCOM positions Anglos and Americans were moving the goal posts, deliber? ately prolonging the inspections and providing intelligence directly to governments that were planning to attack the very sites to which access was demanded.
The arsenal assembled for this exercise in gunboat diplo? macy displayed the latest weapons, some of them designed specifically for the Iraqi arena: titanium-tipped cruise mis? siles, bunker-penetrating and satellite-guided bombs, and the Sensor Fused Weapon that carries multiple "skeet" submunitions each with target-seeking heat sensors. In Feb?
ruary, 28,000 men and women were deployed to the Gulf. The Pentagon had ready detailed plans for penetrating under? ground installations, detonating presidential compounds and neutralizing the Iraqi Republican Guard. Within the militaryindustrial establishment, from the perspective of troop mo? rale in a post-Somalia era and from commercial media outlets Middle East Report ? Spring 1998 that love to hate Saddam, there is a certain imperative to use the expensive new weapons. The deployment alone cost an estimated $100 million per day.
Bombing on this pretext, however, would be like using dy? namite to find the needle in a haystack. Before an attack on the scale threatened could commence, all UNSCOM weapons inspection teams (currently carrying out 95 percent of their inspections) would have to evacuate and monitoring would cease. Humanitarian missions and the "oil-for-food" program would also be suspended. Furthermore, because the Security Council is not prepared to back military action, the multilat? eral elements of the sanctions regime would be dismantled. In addition, Iraq's neighbors' refusal to allow air strikes to be launched from their soil could create political as well as logis? tical problems. Most importantly, destruction of Iraq's mili? tary and social infrastructure would almost certainly bring chaos and further suffering that could easily engage US and The status quo is not sustainable indefinitely. The stan? dard television image of 'the Gul?" of US oil rigs and aircraft carriers glittering over flat sand and water, is something of a mirage. Current American policy still clings to the now-out? moded notion of "dual containment" of Iraq and Iran. Even after a thaw in relations with Tehran, however, all Washington's eggs are in the fragile GCC basket. The rela? tionship of the US to Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Bahrain and the other kingdoms of the Arabian Peninsula is not one of classi? cal metropolitan-client relations. The Arab Gulf states are paying customers who set strict limits on foreigners in their countries. One of the ironies of the recent crisis is that inter? national television reporters enjoy greater access to Baghdad than to Riyadh. The Gulf monarchies' survival may be in? versely related to their loyalty to US military aspirations in their region. The uncertain futures of all the Arab govern? ments of the Gulf region, as well as the huge stockpile of weapons in the Gulf and the wider Middle East, should pro? vide strong incentive for prudent policymakers to empower an autonomous weapons inspections apparatus.
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